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CASES NOTED
PUNITIVE DAMAGES-NO RECOVERY WHEN
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE
COMPROMISED
The minor plaintiff was operating a motorcycle on a hilly road at
night when the defendant's truck, which had only one operating head-
light, allegedly crossed over into the plaintiff's lane of traffic at the
excessive speed of ninety miles per hour and collided with the plaintiff.
The operator of the truck was driving under the influence of alcohol.
The minor plaintiff was seriously injured, necessitating the amputation
of his left arm and left leg. The minor and his father filed a complaint
against the driver and his employer seeking both compensatory and
punitive damages. Thereafter, the parties agreed to a compromise and
settlement of the claim for compensatory damages in the amount of
$147,250. As a result, the parties filed a stipulation which recited that
the defendants expressly denied liability. In reference to the claim for
punitive damages the stipulation stated that:
The parties hereto and counsel recognize that there is pending
an additional claim by the plaintiff ... against defendants...
for punitive damages arising out of the said accident and it is
the intent of all parties and counsel to exclude the claims for
punitive damages from the settlement.
Provided, that this stipulation shall in no way be construed to
mean, that the defendants, or either of them, admit that puni-
tive damages exist and the defendants expressly deny liability
therefor.
The counts in the complaint relating to compensatory damages were
thereafter dismissed. The plaintiffs were given leave to amend their
remaining count for punitive damages, adding reference to the settlement
of compensatory damages and pointing out that the remaining issue for
determination was the defendants' responsibility for punitive damages,
if any. The amendment further directed that the jury should be instructed
not to return a verdict for compensatory damages even though the same
would be shown by the evidence. The defendants then moved to dismiss
the amended complaint which motion was granted. On appeal to the
District Court of Appeal, First District, held, affirmed: The elimination
of compensatory damages from a suit by compromise and settlement
terminates any right to proceed further for punitive damages. Stephenson
v. Collins, 210 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
Exemplary damages have always been recoverable at common law.
One element for the action was proof of actual damage. The practice
of allowing such damages had its origin in cases involving elements
incapable of measurement and therefore within the discretion of the
jury.1 Another theory is that the doctrine had its origin in the failure
1. Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997, rehearing
denied, 346 U.S. 842 (1953).
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of courts to recognize items of recovery for which compensation should
have been given.2
A large majority of jurisdictions recognize that a claim for punitive
damages alone does not constitute a cause of action, and that there
must be a showing of actual injury as a prerequisite to the recovery of
exemplary damages.' Indeed, a number of courts have held that there
must be a finding or an award of actual damages sufficient to support
a judgment before assessing punitive damages.4 However, it should be
pointed out that in many of the latter decisions there was a failure of
pleading or proof or an affirmative finding of actual damages. Conse-
quently, the same result could have been attained under the fundamental
rule in which a showing of actual damages is a prerequisite to an award
of punitive damages.
Another group of courts has applied the more liberal rule that
where the claim for actual damages is sufficiently pleaded and proved,
the fact that the jury failed to award actual damages through inadvertence
or mistake will not require that the award of exemplary damages be set
aside.' Moreover, a strong minority of states find that nominal damages
are a sufficient basis for an award of punitive damages.6
In addition, it is generally agreed that in an action for defamation
per se, an award of punitive damages need not be supported by an award
of compensatory damages.
7
In a majority of jurisdictions, the rule is that a showing of actual
damages is sufficient. Many courts followed the lead taken by Wardman-
Justice Motors, Inc. v. Petrie.' The plaintiff, whose automobile had been
repossessed by the defendant, had first brought an action in replevin
and recovered the property and 1¢. She then brought an action for
malicious and illegal taking. In resolving the problem caused by the
prior action, the court reasoned that if exemplary damages, which could
not be recovered in the replevin case, could not be recovered in the
2. Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580, 59 Am. R. 623, 18 S.W. 351 (1885).
3. Vice v. Auto. Club, 241 Cal. App. 2d 759, 50 Cal. Rptr. 837 (4th Dist. 1966); Armijo
v. Ward Transp., Inc., 134 Col. 275, 302 P.2d 517 (1956); McLain v. Pensacola Coach Corp.,
152 Fla. 876, 13 So.2d 221 (1943) ; but cf. Scalise v. Nat'l Util's Serv., Inc., 120 F.2d 938
(5th Cir. 1941) ; LeJeune Road Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
Winkler v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 66 N.J. Super. 22, 168 A.2d 418 (1961) ; Teich
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 40 Misc. 2d 519, 243 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
4. Sasser v. Miles & Sons Trucking Serv., 119 Cal. App. 2d 239, 259 P.2d 488 (1st Dist.
1953) (plaintiff's waiver in his complaint of claim to compensatory damages held to bar
claim for exemplary damages) ; EckeIs v. Traverse, 362 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1961) ; Byrd v.
Feilding, 238 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
5. Brown v. Grenz, 127 Mont. 49, 257 P.2d 246 (1953) ; Barber v. Hohl, 40 N.J. Super.
526, 123 A.2d 785 (1956) ; Hinson v. A. T. Sistare Constr. Co., 113 S.E.2d 341 (S.C. 1960).
6. Muller v. Reagh, 150 Cal. App. 2d 99, 309 P.2d 826 (1st Dist. 1957) ; Winkler v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 66 N.J. Super. 22, 168 A.2d 418 (1961) ; Moyer v. Cordell,
204 Okla. 255, 228 P.2d 645 (1951). Contra, Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d
841 (1954) ; Byrd v. Feilding, 238 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
7. Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 124 So.2d 441 (Ala. 1960); see Loftsgaarden v.
Reiling, 267 Minn. 181, 126 N.W.2d 154 (1964).
8. 59 App. D.C. 262, 39 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
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present action because actual damage had not been found, it would
result in depriving the plaintiff of her remedy. The court then held that
the proof of actual loss was sufficient to sustain a judgment for punitive
damages.
Montana first applied the rule in Fauver v. Wilkoske9 and more
recently in Brown v. Grenz' ° in which the courts held that where actual
damages appear from the evidence, an award of punitive damages will
stand, even though the verdict does not show a finding of actual damages.
Lower courts in New York" and California" have also applied the
liberal rule. Moreover, there is dictum in the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers'" which indicated
that the Court would find a showing of actual damages sufficient in a
defamation action.
Florida courts evidenced an early liberal trend beyond the majority
view. In Scalise v. National Utilities Service, Inc.,4 the United States
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, explained:
In Florida, as in the federal courts, the giving of punitive
damages is not dependent on, nor must it bear any relation to,
the allowance of actual damages. It is sufficient that there has
been a deliberately wrongful act for which the plaintiff has a
right of action and that the circumstances are such as to autho-
rize the exaction of smart money.' 5
The court also declared that the reckless disregard of another's rights
was an actionable wrong for which a suit for punitive damages could
be maintained.
Two years later, the Supreme Court of Florida in McLain v.
Pensacola Coach Corp.'" observed with apparent approval:
9. 123 Mont. 228, 21.1 P.2d 420 (1949), which held that where actual damages are
shown, the insufficiency of evidence to show its money extent does not preclude the recovery
of exemplary damages, especially because of the jury's failure, due to inadequate instructions,
to assess the amount of actual damages.
10. 127 Mont. 49, 257 P.2d 246 (1953) (action for assault upon tenant and for unlawful
eviction from the leased premises).
11. Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 54 Misc. 2d 277, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct. 1967)
(punitive damages may be granted even though compensatory damages be denied).
12. Topanga Corp. v. Gentile, 249 Cal. App. 2d 681, 58 Cal. Rptr. 713 (2d Dist. 1967),
which decided that the plaintiff was not precluded from recovering exemplary damages on
the ground that it was not given a grant of monetary damages of certain amount. There is
simply a requirement that a tortious act be proven if punitive damages are to be assessed,
based on the principle that the defendant must have committed a tortious act before exemplary
damages can be assessed.
13. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
14. 120 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1941).
15. Id. at 941.
16. 152 Fla. 876, 878, 13 So.2d 221, 222 (1943). In a suit to recover damages for assault
and battery, the trial judge withdrew the claim for exemplary damages from the jury. The
jury found for the defendant holding that the plaintiff had not made out a case for com-
pensatory damages. On appeal the court held that the jury verdict was justified. In passing on
the defendant's claim concerning exemplary damages, the court observed the rule that exem-
plary damages will not be allowed if the allegations as to actual damages are too uncertain
and inadequate to admit of proof.
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In 4 Am. Jur. 219, it is said: 'The general rule that exemplary
or punitive damages are not recoverable in an action of tort
unless actual damages are shown finds application .... [T]he
weight of authority seems to uphold the general rule that exem-
plary or punitive damages are not recoverable in an action
unless actual damages are shown .... '
A later Florida appellate court case, LeJuene Road Hospital, Inc. v.
Watson,17 left the distinction between the use of "shown" and "awarded"
in doubt. A mother was awarded punitive damages at trial as a result
of her son being refused the hospital's services in an emergency. Her
son was awarded compensatory damages. On appeal, the District Court
of Appeal, Third District affirmed the award of compensatory damages
to the son. However, the court decided that the mother could not recover
punitive damages in the absence of an "award" of compensatory damages
to her.
The same court recently regressed from the absolute requirement
of an "award" in Miami National Bank v. Sobel. 8 In that case the
complaint was filed by a guarantor against a lender for the return of
borrowed stock, damages for loss of the use of the stock, damages equal
to the value of real estate which had been foreclosed, and punitive
damages. The court decided that since the complaint furnished no ground
or basis for recovery of compensatory damages, punitive damages would
not be recoverable, making no mention of the word "award."
In the instant case, the court used McLain v. Pensacola Coach
Corp.'9 as its authority and equated the use of the word "shown" to an
"award" or "verdict." The court explained that cases where a separate
proceeding for punitive damages was allowed were justified because a
previous award of compensatory damages had been made at the trial
level. 2° The court attempted to explain its decision by stating:
None of the Florida cases to which counsel has called our atten-
tion permit a "showing" of compensatory damages which have
been the subject of compromise and settlement to serve as the
basis for later trial of a claim for punitive damages alone. It
is our understanding that punitive damages are not independent
of compensatory damages and without a judicial award or
judgment as to the latter, the former may not be found.2'
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a cause of action
17. 171 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
18..198 So.2d 841 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
19. McLain v. Pensacola Coach Corp., 152 Fla. 876, 13 So.2d 221 (1943); see note 16
supra.
20. Doral Country Club, Inc. v. Lindgren Plumbing Co., 175 So.2d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1965) (case remanded after compensatory damages awarded to plaintiff to have jury decide
the question of punitive damages) ; Sideris v. Warrington Motor Co., 181 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1966) (the issue of punitive damages against one defendant was left for future trial at
the plaintiff's option).
21. Stephenson v. Collins, 210 So.2d 733, 736 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1968).
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was not split by finding that compensatory and punitive damages are
interdependent and inseparable. The right to recover for punitive dam-
ages no longer existed after compromise and settlement.22 The court
likewise refused to accept the plaintiffs' estoppel argument by noting
that a plea was made in their brief for a more modern rule. The court
interpreted this as an admission that the plaintiffs knew the rule in
Florida was otherwise.
The dissenting judge desired to follow more literally the rule ap-
proved in McLain v. Pensacola Coach Corp.3 that a "showing" of actual
damages is sufficient to sustain an award of punitive damages:
More correctly stated the rule is, the complainant must estab-
lish his cause of action as a prerequisite to such award. In
negligence cases proof of a personal injury or loss of property
(compensatory damages) is an element of the cause of action,
and all elements of the cause of action must be proved to sustain
an award of exemplary or punitive damages. 22 Am. Jur. 2d,
Damages § 241.24
The judge stated that the general rule in Florida requires that actual
damages be "shown" or "proved," not specifically requiring an actual
award by the jury of compensatory damages as a prerequisite to an
award for punitive damages.
The writer agrees with the dissent and disagrees with the result
obtained by the majority and the manner in which the principles were
applied. By the use of semantics, the court took a step backward by
discouraging settlement and encouraging costly litigation of issues upon
which the parties may not be in disagreement. The outcome of this
decision does not serve the public interest, justice or the reputation of
the legal profession. "A rule . . . should not be declared rigid, inflexible
and inexorable when such declaration would in many, many instances,
for the sake only of convenience to a putative wrongdoer, defeat the
ends of justice.""aa
CAROL MACMILLAN STANLEY
22. Rosenthal v. Scott, 150 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1963) (automobilist's subrogated insurer's
property damage suit, settled in court, and automobilist's instant personal injury suit against
same defendant did not result in prohibited splitting of causes) ; Gaynon v. Statur, 151 Fla.
793, 10 So.2d 432 (1942) (a husband could bring two actions arising out of an automobile
accident causing injuries to himself and his wife, one for his wife's injuries and one for his
own direct damages).
23. See note 16 supra.
24. Stephenson v. Collins, 210 So.2d 733, 737 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
25. Rosenthal v. Scott, 150 So.2d 433, 439 (Fla. 1963).
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